Does the use of Probabilities deny a causal explanation?

Discussions on the philosophical foundations, assumptions, and implications of science, including the natural sciences.

Does the use of Probabilities deny a causal explanation?

Postby lateralsuz on April 7th, 2020, 8:14 am 

I have argued on other threads that if maths (excluding probabilities) embodies the philosophy of Determinism, (ie. produces single inevitable outcomes), then the use of probabilities must demonstrate a breach of Determinist principles.

I didn't get much push-back on this - so let me ask the direct question - Do you agree or not?

If so, would you also agree that any use of probabilities in mathematical models renders that model to be a description rather than an explanation?
lateralsuz
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