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Positor wrote:Yes, please continue. This is an area of philosophy I am particularly interested in.
As for myself, I would definitely not claim to know with certainty that I have a hand, or a body. (Descartes acknowledged that an evil demon could deceive him about such things.) I would, however, claim to be certain that "there exists at present a mind, which is my mind".
I wonder whether "Cartesian" doubt differs from practical, everyday doubt only in degree, or whether these are two radically different forms of doubt. It seems that no amount of empirical evidence could overcome Cartesian doubt, so I wonder whether it should be treated as a separate kind of entity from "ordinary" doubt. Are the two kinds of doubt related to the language game in a similar or a different way? I will be interested to read your further comments.
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I was in a camp near Bayeux after the Normandy landing. A letter from Wittgenstein telling me he was reading Plato's Theaetetus: «Plato in this dialogue is occupied with the same problems that I am writing about.»
-- M. O'C. Drury
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yadayada wrote:I was in a camp near Bayeux after the Normandy landing. A letter from Wittgenstein telling me he was reading Plato's Theaetetus: «Plato in this dialogue is occupied with the same problems that I am writing about.»
-- M. O'C. Drury
Wittgenstein's strict interpretation of knowledge is Platonic enough. I think this is worth keeping in mind in reading On Certainty. Moore's hand waving is a different, private, subjective form of knowledge. Moore assumes that perception is fundamental knowledge. While he might be certain of his hands, perhaps based on experience, I, watching the demonstration, would not be able to eliminate with certainty the possibility of an illusion.
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newyear wrote:Your posts are interesting Sam26. Wittgenstein's work On Certainty does make one think.
We all use a belief system of one kind or another. Schooling would not be possible if every detail of knowledge is questioned as to its validity or not, as probably there would be a lot of 'not valid' material mixed up with valid stuff. For example, we are taught in geography that Mexico as a country exists. It is probably that in most classes no one has ever been to Mexico, but all believe that it is where the teacher pointed it out. Should this piece of knowledge be taken seriously? And, if the answer is yes, should all countries be taken to exist? Or, only some? Should we be told that it depends upon who is doing the explaining, and what belief system they believe in?
Outside one's own sensory abilities, all communication should be questioned as this information may not be valid.
There is another point and that is, does the mind 'recognise' information that is obtained from one's senses on a par with information that has been obtained via communication? Does Wittgenstein elaborate on this point, Sam?
I found this link interesting: http://philforum.berkeley.edu/blog/2011 ... certainty/
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Sam26 wrote: Moore's propositions are offered as a proof of the external world, i.e., he is offering objective evidence (he offers up both of his hands as objective evidence). ... Wittgenstein ... says that the kind of propositions that Moore offers as proof, are not the kind of propositions that one can purport to know, or to doubt for that matter.
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yadayada wrote:Objectivity is determined by general public acceptance of what I claim, which Moore wrongly presumes to already possess for something as common as his hands.
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Lomax wrote:Hello Yadayada,yadayada wrote:Objectivity is determined by general public acceptance of what I claim, which Moore wrongly presumes to already possess for something as common as his hands.
Is the notion that other people exist better-grounded than the notion that one's own hands exist? If not, I wonder why public acceptance would be enough to bolster one's belief in the existence of one's own hands?
Lomax
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Sam26 wrote:How is it that a music tech undergraduate is able to capture part of the essence of what Wittgenstein is saying in this short (rhetorical) question? I like it.
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newyear wrote:Sam26 wrote:How is it that a music tech undergraduate is able to capture part of the essence of what Wittgenstein is saying in this short (rhetorical) question? I like it.
Labels can be pinned upon oneself, and others may pin them. That doesn't mean that the label tells the whole story. If one looks at Lomax's contributions to the forums, this can be observed quickly.
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Sam26 wrote:Why would you even assume that I was putting him/her down?
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newyear wrote:That apart, your posts are excellent and I look forward to reading the next post.
Lomax wrote:Is the notion that other people exist better-grounded than the notion that one's own hands exist? If not, I wonder why public acceptance would be enough to bolster one's belief in the existence of one's own hands?
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Positor wrote:newyear wrote:That apart, your posts are excellent and I look forward to reading the next post.
Yes, so do I.Lomax wrote:Is the notion that other people exist better-grounded than the notion that one's own hands exist? If not, I wonder why public acceptance would be enough to bolster one's belief in the existence of one's own hands?
I think each case needs to be treated on its own merits. The complicating factor is that we are dealing with several non-coinciding dichotomies:
1. Those beliefs about which I cannot be wrong, versus those about which I can.
2. Those beliefs that are automatic and shown in my behaviour, versus those where I consciously consider my certainty or doubt.
3. The beliefs I have about myself (however "myself" is defined), versus those I have about the outside world.
4. My beliefs that are prior to language, versus those that I acquire through language.
One could imagine a Venn diagram with overlapping circles corresponding to the above categories, or a table setting out each permutation of categories. We should be careful not to oversimplify matters.
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newyear wrote:Sam26 wrote:Why would you even assume that I was putting him/her down?
I know you are new to the forums, so perhaps I shouldn't have said anything. However, you gave a label to Lomax in which if you follow some of his posts you will find he has a privileged mind. I know he gives himself this label in his forum profile, but don't be misled. Most of us that love philosophy wouldn't be able to survive for long if we dedicated our efforts to it as a means for a living.
That apart, your posts are excellent and I look forward to reading the next post.
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Lomax wrote:No worries, it read like a compliment haha. I don't think Newyear was implying it were an insult either. Keep up the good thread folks :)
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Sam26 wrote:Wittgenstein is one of the most misunderstood philosophers in history, mainly because of his method of doing philosophy, which allowed him to see the problems of philosophy in a different light. He attacked the very tools philosophers use - the proposition; and he exposed many of the propositions of philosophers as senseless or even nonsense. He did this by examining the logic behind the use of words or propositions. This is not to say that his thoughts were entirely new, but only that he was able to articulate the problems of philosophy with a rigor and genius that few philosophers possess.
Sam26 wrote:The idea of a language-game was introduced by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PI, 7); however, an example of a language-game is given earlier (PI, 2). Wittgenstein never seems to give a definitive definition of language-game, but he does give examples throughout the Philosophical Investigations.
Sam26 wrote:Another way of thinking about language-games is that they are a form of life, that is, in their most basic form you can observe two people building something using simple calls, as in Wittgenstein's example.
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Lomax wrote:yadayada wrote:Objectivity is determined by general public acceptance of what I claim, which Moore wrongly presumes to already possess for something as common as his hands.
Is the notion that other people exist better-grounded than the notion that one's own hands exist? If not, I wonder why public acceptance would be enough to bolster one's belief in the existence of one's own hands?
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Positor wrote:I think we need to consider the following four categories:
1. Subjective certainty where I cannot be wrong (e.g. that I have the sensation of eating an orange or of having a hand
2. Subjective certainty where I can be wrong (e.g. that I am actually eating an orange or actually have a hand, i.e. that my sensations are trustworthy).).
3. Objective certainty where I cannot be wrong (an empty category, since no "knowledge" of the outside world is 100% certain).
4. Objective certainty where I can be wrong (which, strictly speaking, includes all cases of objective certainty, although the likelihood of being wrong can obviously differ greatly).
Categories 2 and 4 would include (a) cases where the possibility of error is negligible (e.g. that I have a hand, or that Mount Everest exists) as well as (b) cases where it is non-negligible (e.g. that that book I see on the table is the one I left there ten minutes ago, rather than an identical-looking one with which someone replaced it when my back was turned). Note that even some beliefs of type (a) can turn out to be wrong (e.g. the former universal assumption that the measured speed of light depends on the observer's speed).
I am not sure that there is a clear distinction between categories 2 and 4. For example, my belief that I have a hand seems to be both a belief about myself (and thus subjective) and a belief about an object in the world (and thus objective).
You are correct, I believe, to say that "...the distinction between bedrock and non-bedrock beliefs [doesn't] always coincides with the distinction between pre-linguistic and language-based beliefs. There seem to be two kinds of bedrock beliefs, (1) those that are pre-linguistic (causal beliefs based on sensory input); and (2), bedrock beliefs within language itself. I will talk more about this later.Also, I am not sure that the distinction between bedrock and non-bedrock beliefs always coincides with the distinction between pre-linguistic and language-based beliefs. A belief I have acquired through language may be shown in my subsequent actions. For example, someone may assure me that a particular food has no long-term ill effects, and I may consequently eat it regularly without consciously thinking each time: "Is this really safe to eat?"
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