Thank you for the comments, but I am afraid you may not have quite got the subtlety of “Mary’s argument.”
To say that one can have all knowledge regarding the physical aspects of color without the conscious experience of color, already presumes that that experience is not included the physical aspects of color—which is the very thing which Jackson has set out to prove. In other words, his premise begs the question; for by it, he has already preordained the result.
Neri wrote:To put it differently, if Mary had been instructed in the immaterial/idealistic view of the world, she would see nothing wrong with presuming that one can have all knowledge about the physical aspects of color without having the conscious experience of color. However, there is nothing that compels her to accept the immaterial/idealistic view. She may just as easily conclude that all that is real is physical. In such case, she would maintain that if one has not had the experience of color, one does not in fact have all knowledge about the physical aspects of color.
Neri wrote:It is true that one can experience color in dreams. However, this would not make that experience less physical if, in any case, it results from physical interactions in the brain. The only difference would be that the waking experience of color has immediate representative content, for it is instigated by real conditions outside the central nervous system. In dreaming colors, the brain (by the faculty of memory) recreates the experience of color without immediate prompting from the world.
Neri wrote:Because, it would have been clear from her studies that the experiences of colors have physical causes, both within and without the body, she would have concluded that the experiences of colors were themselves physical. She would have arrived at this conclusion, because the “physical” belongs to the spatio-temporal realm while the non-physical is said to belong to a wholly separate realm outside of time and space. Because no causal nexus can possibly exist between such utterly different realms of reality, Mary reached the conclusion that no non-physical entity can result from a physical cause--thus, her conclusion that the experiences of colors are themselves physical.
Neri wrote:To equate “all knowledge of the physical aspects of a thing” with “only such knowledge as the physical sciences can provide” is to make the wholly unwarranted assumption that only science can provide knowledge of the physical aspects of the world.
Neri wrote:I am afraid that if Mary descends from the “immaterial/idealistic view” to the depths of solipsism, her condition is hopeless; for she would attach no objective distinction between being in the black-and-white room and being outside in the world of color. Both locations would be only concoctions of her mind. Thus, to her, Jackson’s analysis would have no meaning and would prove nothing. In fact, she would consider you, me, Jackson and this forum to be only “manifestations of her own cognisant awareness.”
Neri wrote:Eating a turkey dinner would provide nourishment whether or not it is accompanied by the conscious experience of satiety. The manner in which it provides nourishment lends itself to expression in words. Mary can easily conclude (as she did with the experience of color) that the experience of satiety, while it does not lend itself to verbal explication, is an effect of physical causes and consequently must itself be physical.
Neri wrote:Qualia do not result from “brain states.” They are caused by physical interactions in the brain and are suffusions of electro-chemical energy converted from the oxidation of food. As such they do not “contribute” to the total energy of the universe. They are included in it. Because qualia are physical, they cause predictable physical effects as registered on the electroencephalograph.
These suffusions of energy are the experience of qualia. We cannot properly say that qualia are how this energy “appears to us”; for there is no “us” independent of the qualia. We are our qualia.
Neri wrote:[(c) is (b) taken as private knowledge (“subjective” perspective). (b) is (c) taken as public knowledge through shared data, which are usually visual qualia. (“objective” perspective). Each is a different way of knowing the same spatio-temporal process.]
You seem to be saying that the realm of time and space (the physical world) can cause an effect lying outside that realm.
If I understand you correctly, you say that (c) is a way of knowing (b), but (b) is not a way of knowing (c). By this analysis, you assume that (b) is the thing itself and that (c) is just the experience it engenders. Thus, you say that to equate (b) and (c) is to equate knowledge of a thing with the thing itself.
Qualia, like all else in the world, cannot exist without some expense of time. Indeed, a quale with no duration is no quale at all.
Further, we are aware that conscious experiences are spatially located in the head and travel through space with the body.
One cannot properly say that qualia do not belong to the world of time and space, simply because they cannot be weighed like a pound of meat. Light, for example, has no weight (no mass whatsoever), yet it is physical because it is a spatio-temporal process. Light may not have the “same structural qualities” as a pound of meat, yet light is manifestly physical. The same may be said of that to which both (b) or (c) refer.
“Qualia” is, in a way, an unfortunate expression; for it equates two basically different kinds of conscious experiences—(1) those that are triggered by real conditions outside the central nervous system and (2) those that are not. (1) are representational sense impressions providing a means of recognizing things in the external world and are the ultimate source of all so-called objective knowledge. We say that the latter is “objective,” because it is shared-- a matter of public knowledge.
On the other hand, (2) consist of “raw feels,” dreams, sensory hallucinations and the like. These represent nothing outside the central nervous system. Certainly, they provide some knowledge, in their own way, of energetic processes within that system itself. Because these experiences are private, they are called “subjective.” Some (but not all) knowledge of a these same processes can be obtained by objective qualia such as sight (as augmented by scientific instruments). A reasonably sufficient understanding of any conscious process can only be gained by both the subjective and objective qualia that refer to it. In either case, one is probing the same physical process, all the properties of which are not necessarily accessible in this way.
Neri wrote:In your example of a man walking on the street, you apparently make a distinction between (A) the “phenomenal speed” of his motion in the quale and (B) the “real speed” of his motion in the world. This is based on the notion that what is “real-in-itself” is perfectly measurable and what is phenomenal is not. This overlooks the fact that all measurement is phenomenal.
The problem is: How do we escape the trap of solipsism if my awaking in bed and consulting my friends also turns out to be a dream? In other words, how can I possibly be equipped to distinguish objective speed from subjective speed?
My answer is this:
A quale that represents objective distances, times and speeds is one that enjoys public assent. More than this, we cannot say. Public assent is itself real, because others are real. They must be real and not part of the qualia of a single subject, because any subject experiences qualia that are unknowable to others unless they can be expressed linguistically.
However, none of this means that objective metrics are mind-independent. Indeed, they are only tools of thought; for time and space are ideas derived from the shared experience of happening. Things in the world really happen, but not in fully determinable measures. Thus, the correspondence between experience and reality [which constitutes qualia of type (1)] is a correspondence between the experience of happening and happening itself—and not between the experience of measure and measure itself.
Jehu wrote:It is easy to assert something like: “ Give a machine of the appropriate level of complexity it will achieve conscious, and experience qualia.”, but it is quite another thing to produce such a sentient machine.
Neri wrote: Logical and mathematical principles are inferred from long term memories..we infer time and space as the ingredients of Happening. Time and space are discursive and not intuitive.
DragonFly wrote:Since color qualia come from the physical e/m waves then they are physical, too, even in their new face painted upon these waves as re-presented. It is of the brain perceiving itself.
dragonFly wrote:In fact, everything is guaranteed as physical.
dragonFly wrote:As for anything intangible or non-physical, it, of course, could not react with the tangible/physical, for how could it even talk that talk.
dragonFly wrote:Now, is there a difference between physical and material?
dragonFly wrote:Would space just be physical, as it has the single quantity of volume, and thus not material?
dragonFly wrote:Or is space material, as well, if indeed it can curve?
dragonFly wrote:I'm not speaking of anything that occupies space.
dragonFly wrote:Another point is that time and space may be wrapped up in 4D spacetime, although it seems to us as 3D space and 1D time separated.
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