neuro » March 16th, 2015, 6:35 pm wrote:It does not seem to me that this was the claim in that article.
It seems to me the point was:
1) Chalmer states that we clearly have the perception that the process of "sensing" something is a subjective experience that does not reduce to the
physical effects brought about in our brain. The hard problem of consciousness then arises as the need to explain what is the relation between such physical events and our consciousness.
2) The reported experiments suggest that we clearly have the perception that the process of "sensing" something is a subjective experience - which does not reduce to the
physical effects brought about in our brain -
only when such experience is associated to an emotional valence.
This, if proven true, would invalidate Chalmer's starting point.
And if this were the case, then there would not be any "hard problem" with phenomenal consciousness, we could reduce it to the physical events occurring in our brain (or in a robot's "brain") and the "hard problem" of consciousness would vanish, because it would be split into two components: a purely physical phenomenal consciousness and a "personal" and "subjective" emotional reaction to such phenomenal consciousness when it has some vital valence (which is much less hard to attribute to physical and biological mechanisms and processes).
Actually, this is a nice way of putting it: when an oblique line is present in our visual field, a number of neurons fire in the associative visual cortex; those that are best tuned to the precise angle of the line fire most actively. So, phenomenal consciousness of an oblique line can simply be reduced to the pattern of discharge of a population of neurons, which all together converge in indicating that it is more probable that a line with a certain inclination is there, rather than a line with a different inclination or some other visual element.
This activity pattern in neurons doesn't have any vital relevance and does not reach our consciousness unless it gets associated with some meaning that makes it somehow relevant.
This process can be explained by neural selective attention mechanisms, that "filtrate" experiential inputs (and internally arising associations and thoughts) based on "emotional" relevance and pertinence with the current flow path of our thought processes.
Finally, if the specific neuronal activity pattern that "detects" a "signal" (something that can be attributed a meaning) elicits an emotional response, with its associated complex pattern of bodily sensations (visceral sensations and proprioceptive perception of emotion-associated mimic and postural acts - what Damasio has called the somatic marker of emotion), then we have a more complex experience that adds the "subjective" and "personal" feeling to the sensations.
This last step, however, is independent of phenomenal consciousness.
Feeling pain is a complex emotional reaction to a physical response of the nervous system, but the "personal" component of this does not arise from the QUALIA of sensation due to phenomenal consciousness:
- either it arises from the emotional response generated by those "qualia" (which, per se, simply reduce to neuronal activity patterns)
- or the "qualia" have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness and simply reflect emotional valence of sensations (which I believe is not what people usually mean by the term "qualia")
I will first tip off the readers to the fact that the post I am responding to above was written in march of 2015. I am cognizant that the original poster has departed the forum likely years ago. This reply does not serve as a reply to user Neuro, but as a continuation of a conversation here for others.
Neuro in this post above, has attempted to adopt a position called Eliminative Materialism. All such positions are complex intellectual traditions containing colorful castes of characters and writers over many centuries. For the purposes of a forum of this type, a desperately short synopsis of "Eliminative Materialism" is "the brain does it".
Eli-mat is a position that consciousness is ontologically equivalent to the "actions of firing neurons" in heads. Eli-mat is not in the mainstream. The vast majority of working neuroscientists today do not subscribe to it. As we shall see below, many highly esteemed scientist do not subscribe to Eli-mat.
I will ask you to re-read Neuro's post, but during the second read-over, notice the following.
1. Neuro has smuggled an identity-that-experiences into his descriptions, in a sneaky way that you overlooked. In short, he has invoked an Experiencing Homonculus in several parts of his description that intended to "reduce" conscious experience to the firing of neurons.
To help guide you, here is one sentence where the smuggling was done
then we have a more complex experience that adds the "subjective" and "personal" feeling to the sensations.
Read that sentence again. Neuro is trying to prove that "having experience" reduces to neuronal firing patterns in the brain, and he is basically attempting to reduce that by asserting that we have experiences. That is circular logic.
"we have a more complex experience"? Uhm.... Who is we? Where is this "we" located in spacetime? Further where is this "we" located in the brain?
To achieve the goal Eli-mat is attempting to do, you cannot avoid these questions by fluffing through them with poetic conversational language. You must describe in concrete terms why this tissue in the brain feels like a "we" having conscious experiences.
Another example
This activity pattern in neurons doesn't have any vital relevance and does not reach our consciousness unless it gets associated with some meaning that makes it somehow relevant. This process can be explained by neural selective attention mechanisms, that "filtrate" experiential inputs (and internally arising associations and thoughts) based on "emotional" relevance and pertinence with the current flow path of our thought processes.
"does not reach our consciousness". What does he mean by "does not reach our consciousness" ? Is there a central location in the brain that is conscious, but the other parts are not, and so the signals have to "get there"? But why is that part of the brain the conscious part and the other are not? Of course, you and I both understand what Neuro meant at at a conversational level. Sure. It makes sense as a working story. But what are the exact neuronal mechanisms? An Eli-mat has to answer every one of these questions with exact neuronal mechanisms. What Neuro has written is not a reduction to firing patterns. This is futile hand-waving at the Hard Problem.
Now that you can see what the trick is, you will notice that Neuro believed he has solved the Hard Problem by reducing it to neuronal firing patterns in the brain. In totally legal terms, Neuro basically described that when the neuronal signals pass through a filter, they reach the consciousness-processing center, and an experience happens. That's not an
explanation , at all. In reality, Neuro has not even put a dent in this problem. In reality Neuro hasn't even scratched the surface of the problem.
Inferential GapEd Witten is one of the greatest living physicists alive today. He is easily in the top 5. His office is a chaired at Princeton's Institute of Advanced Study (IAS). Among working physicists, many of them contend he is the number 1 greatest living physicist. Ed Witten was the sole discoverer of M-theory , an 11-dimensional generalization of String Theory. This is what Dr. Witten has said about consciousness.
Ed Witten wrote:I imagine that it would be easier to explain the Big Bang in scientific terms, than it would be to explain consciousness in scientific terms.
It was Chalmers himself that said the following. Even if you had a complete and exhaustive wiring diagram of the brain, could you infer from that diagram that the brain was having internal experiences?
Many intelligent, highly-esteemed scientists from a host of disciplines have concluded that you cannot make that inference. It's a non-sequitur.
They might be wrong. But
they might be right.Of course, you could always do what Eliminative Materialists do, and just accept the inference as fact on purely dogmatic grounds. Force it as an axiom in your philosophy.
Go ahead and do that. No harm no foul. Just don't pretend you are sitting on hotcakes evidence that "proves" Eli-mat.