Re: Are Our Choices Predetermined By Our Nature?
by davidm on November 26th, 2019, 12:31 pm
Fatalism is the thesis that the future is “fated” to be, and therefore it is idle (the ancient Greek “idle argument”) to try to do anything about the future.
Example: if you are sick, it is fated that you should either die, or recover. Therefore, it is idle (futile) to consult a doctor, since whether you consult a doctor or not, the outcome — death or recovery — cannot be altered or avoided.
The determinist rejects this. Determinism, broadly, is the thesis that the laws of physics, in conjunction with antecedent events, entail all future events, including human actions. But the determinist would disagree with the fatalist by saying that by consulting a doctor, you might well avoid death and bring about recovery. So it is not futile to consult a doctor. However, your decision whether to consult a doctor is determined, says the determinist.
Logical determinism, or logical fatalism — the terms are often interchanged — is that all future contingent propositions already, today, have truth values (are either true or false — principle of bivalence).
The prime example is Aristotle’s sea battle argument. Suppose that today, it is already true that tomorrow, there will be a sea battle. In that case, nothing anyone can do, can prevent a sea battle. The sea battle must happen of necessity, regardless of what anyone says or does. Thus we have no free will, on this account.
To forestall this conclusion, Aristotle and others have argued that future contingent propositions do not already have truth values, but are indeterminate until the event in question happens, or fails to happen.
The argument to logical fatalism/determinism is, however, logically incorrect. It commits the modal fallacy — confusing necessary with contingent truth. It also gets the flow of truth-making backward, supposing that a true proposition, today, of an event that happens in the future, somehow makes that event happen. To see how fallacious this is, forget about future events, and consider merely present ones. Consider the proposition: “The sun is rising right now.” Does this proposition make the sun rise, or is the proposition true because the sun is rising? The answer seems obvious.
The idea that truth values reside in propositions that describe the world is the Tarskian, or correspondence theory, of truth. If it is true today that a sea battle will happen tomorrow, it is not necessary that a sea battle will happen — that is the modal fallacy, and a confusion, as described above in the case of the sun rising, with prescription vs. description. (Propositions, in correspondence theory, are never prescriptive, but always descriptive.)
All that is necessary, in the case of the sea battle, is that the truth value of the prior proposition, and the future event that the proposition describes, must match. Hence, it can never be the case that it is true today that a sea battle will happen tomorrow, but a sea battle does not happen; and it can never be the case that it is true today that a sea battle will NOT happen tomorrow, but that a sea battle does happen. Whether the sea battle happens or not is entirely contingent, and hence neither fated nor pre-determined. Thus logical determinism/fatalism cannot impugn human free will, whether that free will is held to be libertarian, compatibilist, or neo-Humean.
As to determinism precluding free will, the compatibilist maintains that determinism is necessary for free will — if determinism were not true, then one could never predict the outcomes of one’s actions, and in such a chaotic universe, sentient creatures almost surely would not exist. The compatibilist does not deny that our desires are determined — as Schopenhauer said, we can do as we will, but we cannot will what we will. The compatbilist maintains that our will is free just so far as we can freely choose to act (or not act) on our determined desires. Example: if we do not eat, we get hungry. This hunger is outside our control. But we are free to eat, or not to eat, as we choose. Most people choose to eat when they are hungry, but some do not. Some diet, some fast for religious or other reasons, some go on hunger strikes for political or other reasons. Those are free choices, coupled with determined desires. (Kant maintained that compatibilist free will was a “wretched subterfuge,” but that is a separate, complex discussion.)
Libertarian free will, also known as contra-causal free will, maintains that we could have done other, than what we actually did, even given identical antecedent events. The compatibilist disagrees, saying that given identical antecedent events, we’d do the same thing; but given even slightly different antecedent events, we’d do something different. This, too, is a whole separate discussion, and quite complex.
The neo-Humean challenges the entire deterministic thesis: the idea that the laws of physics, in conjunction with antecedent events, entail all future outcomes, including human actions. The neo-Humean holds that this definition commits the same prescriptive/descriptive error as described about, according to correspondence theory. Briefly, the neo-Humean rejects the idea that the laws of physics govern the universe — that said laws prescribe what happens. Rather, such “laws” are not laws at all, but descriptions of what does happen. Fleshing this out to its logical conclusion, the alleged incompatibility between determinism and free will collapses. Again, this is a separate, rather complex discussion.
Another issue is that many people, wrongly, assume that in order have free will, we must be able to change the future. But I cannot change the future, any more than I can change the past — or the present, for that matter. Once one sees that changing the past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite of free will, the whole argument against free will is dissolved. Example: when I do something in the present, NOW, I do not “change” the present — I make the present be, what in fact it is. To change the present (or the past or future) would require that I both do, and not do, some particular thing, at the same time. This would be a violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction, and instantiating a logical contradiction can never be a pre-requisite of free will or of anything else.
ETA: see Vat's link.